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Lying Jackasses
Sep. 25th, 2004 09:55 pmRecently on an LJ of one of my friends, I ran across a comment from someone else who said that the WMD justification for the war on Iraq was valid, because Iraq's WMD program was as advanced as Iran's is now.
[Before I get called out on it, though I doubt I would, I will correct my own post. The person actually asserted that Iraq did not have a program that far advanced. This was in the context of asserting that this was an unreasonable level to set as the standard of "WMD program"--that is, that although Iraq was not at the level that Iran is now, it would be perfectly reasonable to say that Iraq's nuke program qualified as a WMD program. Read on with that caveat and I'll come back with a further clarification at the end.]
Let's look at that a little more closely.
From the UNMOVIC and I(nternationa) A(tomic) E(nergy) A(gency) summary of the situation:
More of the summary makes it clear that all of this progress occurred before the Gulf War in 1991. The program was completely dismantled by 1998; by 1998, Iraq's nuclear weapons program was less advanced than, say, Mayberry, North Carolina. Inspectors were allowed back into Iraq in 2002, and intense scrutiny indicated that the program had not been revived. In other words, even though there were no inspections, Iraq had taken no steps to pursue nuclear weapons in the five years before the invasion, for the simple reason that it's really amazingly hard to completely conceal a nuclear program from someone who is watching closely. No one has managed to create one in total secrecy since 1945, and Saddam Hussein, who was evil but not insane, had to know that if he tried to sneak one into existence, the US would know and take action.
Iran, on the other hand, has an active nuclear program right now. Weapons-grade uranium has been found (in, admittedly, microscopic quantities) in Iran within the past year.
Now, it's possible--hell, I'd even say probable--that if the US and the UN decided that Iraq was no longer any type of threat and completely removed all inspections, all monitoring, and all surveillance, then Iraq could have had a nuclear bomb in the next decade. However, that scenario is approximately equally likely as the Enriched Uranium Fairy appearing in Ougadougou and make Burkino Faso the newest member of the nuclear club.
The Iraqi nuclear program was a non-issue. Don't overlook the degree to which the Bush-Cheney-Rove machine presented evidence they themselves knew to be on the borderline between "questionable" and "outright fraudulent" to promote the idea that Iraq had an active nuclear weapons program. They didn't. Anyone who tells you otherwise is hoping that you're stupid and ignorant and incapable of drawing distinctions between "had" and "once had but don't have any more".
[My overall point stands: After the Gulf War, Iraq had no nuclear weapons program to speak of. Referring to the threat of Iraq's "WMD programs" as a justification for the war--which many "neo""con"s still do--is elevating the programs from the level of a wistful dream to the level of a dire threat. It's fundamentally dishonest and the only people who would do so are people who are happy to bolster their policy dreams with a sandbag-wall of lies and fantasies of national greatness through mass slaughter.]
[Before I get called out on it, though I doubt I would, I will correct my own post. The person actually asserted that Iraq did not have a program that far advanced. This was in the context of asserting that this was an unreasonable level to set as the standard of "WMD program"--that is, that although Iraq was not at the level that Iran is now, it would be perfectly reasonable to say that Iraq's nuke program qualified as a WMD program. Read on with that caveat and I'll come back with a further clarification at the end.]
Let's look at that a little more closely.
From the UNMOVIC and I(nternationa) A(tomic) E(nergy) A(gency) summary of the situation:
By the time the inspectors were withdrawn [in 1998], the IAEA had been able to draw a comprehensive and coherent picture of Iraq's past nuclear weapons programme, and to dismantle the programme. The IAEA had destroyed, removed or rendered harmless all of the physical capabilities of Iraq to produce amounts of nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance. The IAEA had concluded with respect to Iraq's past nuclear programme that:
1. There were no indications to suggest that Iraq had been successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons.
2. All nuclear material of significance to Iraq's nuclear weapons programme was verified and fully accounted for, and all nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material (plutonium and high enriched uranium) was removed from Iraq.
3. Iraq had successfully concentrated uranium from its own ore and produced industrial quantities of feed material (UCl4) for electromagnetic isotopic separation (EMIS). There were no indications that the production of feed material for centrifuge enrichment (UF6) went beyond laboratory level.
4. Iraq had been at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of high enriched uranium through the EMIS process and the production and pilot cascading of single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge machines. However, there were no indications to suggest that Iraq had produced more than a few grams of nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material through its indigenous processes.
5. Iraq had explored several other enrichment routes, including gaseous diffusion, chemical enrichment and laser enrichment without achieving any significant progress.
6. Iraq had made major progress in the area of weaponisation, but still had significant hurdles to overcome before being able to complete the fabrication of a first nuclear implosion device.
7. There were no indications that there remained in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.
8. There were no indications of significant discrepancies between the technically coherent picture which had evolved of Iraq's past programme and the information contained in the "Full, Final and Complete Declaration" (FFCD) submitted by Iraq to the IAEA, pursuant to resolution 707 (1991), in 1996, and supplemented in 1998.
More of the summary makes it clear that all of this progress occurred before the Gulf War in 1991. The program was completely dismantled by 1998; by 1998, Iraq's nuclear weapons program was less advanced than, say, Mayberry, North Carolina. Inspectors were allowed back into Iraq in 2002, and intense scrutiny indicated that the program had not been revived. In other words, even though there were no inspections, Iraq had taken no steps to pursue nuclear weapons in the five years before the invasion, for the simple reason that it's really amazingly hard to completely conceal a nuclear program from someone who is watching closely. No one has managed to create one in total secrecy since 1945, and Saddam Hussein, who was evil but not insane, had to know that if he tried to sneak one into existence, the US would know and take action.
Iran, on the other hand, has an active nuclear program right now. Weapons-grade uranium has been found (in, admittedly, microscopic quantities) in Iran within the past year.
Now, it's possible--hell, I'd even say probable--that if the US and the UN decided that Iraq was no longer any type of threat and completely removed all inspections, all monitoring, and all surveillance, then Iraq could have had a nuclear bomb in the next decade. However, that scenario is approximately equally likely as the Enriched Uranium Fairy appearing in Ougadougou and make Burkino Faso the newest member of the nuclear club.
The Iraqi nuclear program was a non-issue. Don't overlook the degree to which the Bush-Cheney-Rove machine presented evidence they themselves knew to be on the borderline between "questionable" and "outright fraudulent" to promote the idea that Iraq had an active nuclear weapons program. They didn't. Anyone who tells you otherwise is hoping that you're stupid and ignorant and incapable of drawing distinctions between "had" and "once had but don't have any more".
[My overall point stands: After the Gulf War, Iraq had no nuclear weapons program to speak of. Referring to the threat of Iraq's "WMD programs" as a justification for the war--which many "neo""con"s still do--is elevating the programs from the level of a wistful dream to the level of a dire threat. It's fundamentally dishonest and the only people who would do so are people who are happy to bolster their policy dreams with a sandbag-wall of lies and fantasies of national greatness through mass slaughter.]
